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DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN 
PHARMACEUTICAL TORTS: JUSTICE 
WHERE JUSTICE IS DUE? 
CHEN-SEN WU, M.D., J.D.* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Ongoing tort reform efforts attest to the significant burden that medical 
liability imposes on the health care system.1  General attempts to curb excesses 
can narrow socioeconomic disparities, but as Clark Havighurst and Barak 
Richman observe, such measures may leave intact some of the regressive 
characteristics of the framework they supplant.2  Therefore, it seems 
appropriate to question whether tort law offers a proper platform for 
distributive justice.  Would restrictions or other changes in medical liability 
unduly sacrifice individual justice for corporate justice?  Would solutions 
outside tort law enhance distributive justice as—or perhaps more—effectively, 
while still giving each person his or her due? 
To help resolve these questions, this article continues where Havighurst and 
Richman left off with medical malpractice.  Part II revisits their suggested 
reforms to show how a tort-centered approach might aggravate socioeconomic 
disparities without dramatically leveling the playing field.  Parts III through V 
of the article explain why pharmaceutical litigation again teaches that discretion 
may be the better part of valor when it comes to amending tort law for the sake 
of distributive justice.  Although it is difficult to determine how the billions of 
dollars in products liability translate in terms of additional burdens on the 
health care system, further scrutiny is warranted before overarching 
pronouncements are made about the progressive or regressive tendencies of 
medical torts, considering the sheer scale of mass pharmaceutical litigation.  
Accordingly, Part III first discusses how traditional perceptions of class actions 
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 1. See, e.g., Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2005, 
H.R. 5, 109th Cong. (2005) (as passed by H.R., July 29, 2005). 
 2. Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 69 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 71 (Autumn 2006) (discussing the capitation of non-economic damages).  
Capping non-economic damages still allows wealthier plaintiffs to collect more, as economic-damages 
calculations take into account a plaintiff’s lost future income.  E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §906(b) cmt. b (1965) (detailing calculation of damages based on lost future income). 
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and market forces create the expectation that—economic damages aside—
pharmaceutical torts afford average Americans a relatively fair opportunity for 
restitution.  Part IV surveys major pharmaceutical products liability cases from 
the past two to three decades to illustrate how overriding concerns for 
individual justice render class actions inert as a vehicle for distributive justice.  
Part V highlights important differences between individually adjudicated, 
plaintiff-by-plaintiff drug liability cases and ordinary, patient-by-patient medical 
malpractice litigation that help preserve mass pharmaceutical actions.  To 
capture some of the divergent influences on distributive justice, Part VI 
explores the downstream effects of drug liability and the litigation process itself.  
The article concludes that, until empirical evidence clarifies the net distributive 
impact of pharmaceutical torts, the capacity for tort reform to rectify 
distributive injustices in health care will remain far from obvious.3 
II 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
Beginning first in the medical malpractice context, Havighurst and Richman 
note that defensive medicine and liability insurance exacerbate distributive 
injustices in health care.4  Wealthier patients receive more care and siphon more 
money from the malpractice insurance pool because of their greater propensity 
and capacity to sue.5  Litigious inclinations aside, higher-income patients also 
command a disproportionate share of the liability funds because of higher 
economic damage assessments.6  Thus, the fallout from malpractice claims 
(defensive medicine and the passing of liability costs onto patients) and the 
adjudication process itself (income-based compensation) exert regressive 
effects. 
Recognizing both these facets of malpractice suits, Havighurst and Richman 
propose solutions that address each in turn.7  Their plea for freedom to 
negotiate care could substantially decrease the estimated $70–$126 billion spent 
on defensive medicine per year.8  However, less affluent patients may suffer a 
 
 3. My analysis focuses on the fairness of the judicial remedy itself, due to the lack of empirical 
evidence on the secondary consequences of pharmaceutical products liability and to the attention this 
topic has already received from others.  Concentrating on the litigation mechanics also seems 
reasonable since part of the goal is to shed light on whether legislators can make refinements in the tort 
system that would achieve greater equity without trampling upon individual justice.  Although the 
ramifications of liability are invariably tied to the legal standards and proceedings themselves, reforms 
outside of tort law may better address those issues while leaving room for important changes within tort 
law itself. 
 4. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 64–71. 
 5. Id. at 70. 
 6. For an explanation, see the text supra at note 2. 
 7. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, passim. 
 8. JUDYTH PENDELL, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, THE 
ADVERSE SIDE EFFECTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL LITIGATION 2–3 (2003) (citing Alex Azar, Liability 
and Patient Health, Transcript of Conference Sponsored by AEI-Brookings Joint Center and Common 
Good, March 4, 2003). 
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severe disadvantage with regard to information.  “Care by contract” may 
prompt them to forego services that preserve health and save money in the long 
run.9  The state of affairs might thereby transform from one in which less 
wealthy patients pay for care they do not want, to one where they want—or 
need—care that they can even less afford.10  Although Havighurst and Richman 
might thus support a certain baseline level of preventive medicine, it is unclear 
that broadly defined regulations could satisfactorily accomplish this objective.  
Practice guidelines are just “guidelines” precisely because patient circumstances 
vary tremendously.11  Just as lawmakers cannot fashion rules for every situation, 
practice guidelines and regulations cannot replace individualized evaluation of 
medical need. 
It is this need for personalized assessment that has helped reserve a place 
for medical malpractice suits.  Some sort of third-party, case-by-case 
determination seems necessary before officially branding providers as 
charlatans.12  Subsequently, eliminating a cause of action for failure to provide 
care may simply substitute one form of third-party review for another.  Without 
the tort option, some sort of independent examination might still be warranted 
to keep providers accountable.  Whether or not a “guilty” finding imposes a 
financial penalty, providers would still have incentive to practice defensive 
medicine.  As Havighurst and Richman themselves maintain, the reputational 
and emotional toll alone could drive such behavior.13 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has similarly hypothesized that so-
called defensive medicine is motivated by desire for profit and possible benefit 
to patients.14  Poorer patients, as Havighurst and Richman point out, may not as 
readily challenge authority figures,15 perhaps including when providers urge 
them to purchase more care.  Consequently, the freedom-of-contract approach 
may not significantly rein in the waste associated with defensive or profit-
oriented medicine, though a non-judicial process might lower administrative 
costs. 
Meanwhile, Havighurst and Richman’s proposal to cap economic damages 
might help equalize the prospective compensation for richer versus poorer 
 
 9. By “care by contract,” I am referring to Havighurst and Richman’s proposal to allow patients 
to negotiate and contract for their own particularized care.  They argue that regulatory minimums, 
purchasing agents, and other protective mechanisms may ameliorate informational disparities (see 
Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 80), but these devices may not supplant the need for 
adjudication.  See text, infra. 
 10. The current state of affairs already features both elements, but the health of the less wealthy 
could get worse if they select their own health care. 
 11. Part IV infra illustrates the degree to which patient circumstances may vary on a single health 
parameter, let alone in terms of an individual’s overall medical picture. 
 12. Independent determination appears necessary so that a patient might have a fighting chance 
for redress or vindication while helping ensure that physicians are not falsely accused of providing 
substandard care. 
 13. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 65. 
 14. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 6 (2004) 
[hereinafter LIMITING TORT LIABILITY]. 
 15. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 70. 
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plaintiffs, but it would not equalize their respective tendencies to sue.  
Moreover, although malpractice awards can amount to billions in the 
aggregate,16 profit-induced medicine appears to impose a much greater financial 
burden on society as a whole than litigation.17  Hence, capping economic 
damages might sacrifice individual justice (the wealthy do not recoup their 
losses) without substantially improving socioeconomic disparities.  If so, 
answers outside the tort system may more appropriately and effectively address 
distributive injustices.18  For example, some of the economic solutions that 




A. Importance of Pharmaceutical Liability 
Medical malpractice represents just one category of medical torts.  Another 
major component is pharmaceutical litigation.  To put matters in perspective, in 
2002, malpractice payments totaled approximately $24 billion.20  Analysts 
project that the ongoing Vioxx litigation alone will cost Merck anywhere from 
$8 to as much as $50 billion (spread over several years).21  As mentioned, 
evaluating the health care repercussions of such liability requires further 
empirical research, but the magnitude of liability itself merits closer scrutiny of 
the litigation mechanics.  Indeed, the conventional thinking that Havighurst and 
Richman allude to—that tort law permits ordinary Americans to obtain justice 
from the wealthy and powerful22—may seem especially compelling when applied 
to litigation where thousands of average citizens gain billions of dollars in 
restitution.23 
 
 16. In 2002, malpractice payments amounted to an estimated $24 billion.  LIMITING TORT 
LIABILITY, supra note 14, at 6. 
 17. See PENDELL, supra note 8, at 2–3 (estimating that profit-motivated care raises health care 
costs by $70-$126 billion per year). 
 18. Certainly, the malpractice system is far from perfect.  For instance, it sometimes penalizes 
physicians who committed no wrong while leaving negligent physicians unpunished.  See JOINT ECON. 
COMM., THE PERVERSE NATURE OF THE MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM, REP. 109-2, at 1 (2005), 
available at http://www.house.gov/jec/publications/109/03-21-05.pdf.  Such flaws could affect distributive 
justice, but reform efforts should more directly target socioeconomic disparities. 
 19. For example, they advocate competition among insurance plans that would maximize the per-
dollar value of premium payments. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 16. 
 20. LIMITING TORT LIABILITY, supra note 14, at 6. 
 21. Heather Won Tesoriero, Defending Multiple Vioxx Cases Is Costly Burden for Merck, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 26, 2006, at B1; Matthew Herper, Vioxx Liability Could Force Biotechs to Merge, FORBES, 
Sept. 14, 2005. 
 22. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 64. 
 23. For example, plaintiffs in the Fen-Phen/Redux diet drug litigation stand to share $22 billion in 
settlement and other payouts.  Robert Lenzner & Michael Maiello, The $22 Billion Gold Rush, 
FORBES, Apr. 10, 2006.  By some estimates, however, seventy percent of the awards go to patients who 
“aren’t sick and don’t deserve it.” Id. 
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B. Traditional Role of Class Actions 
To appreciate the distributive justice implications of pharmaceutical torts, it 
is necessary to begin with a brief description of the problems with medical 
malpractice.  As Havighurst and Richman observe, the limitations may be 
several-fold.24  First, plaintiffs’ attorneys are often more willing to accept cases 
with higher returns.  Lower-income patients may thus find it more difficult to 
obtain representation because they command lower economic damages.  
Second, wealthier patients may have a greater capacity to discover that they 
have fallen victim to malpractice.  As a result, they may seek legal recourse 
more frequently than their less affluent counterparts.  Third, richer patients 
may have more confidence in their prospects of prevailing against wealthy and 
powerful caregivers and institutions.  Again, this would increase the likelihood 
of suits by higher-income individuals. 
These barriers to access are of course neither new nor unique to medical 
malpractice.  It is with these concerns in mind, as well as those of administrative 
efficiency, that class actions evolved as a judicial remedy.  The aggregation of 
individual claims provides plaintiffs’ attorneys with the financial incentive to 
solicit plaintiffs regardless of their income.  The more plaintiffs that attorneys 
recruit, the larger the size of the pot—all with minimal extra “overhead” for 
representing additional clients.25  Such “strength in numbers” may also 
encourage ordinary citizens to participate in litigation against otherwise 
daunting adversaries.  Class actions thereby help overcome the usual 
impediments to justice for the common citizen. 
C. Class Actions for Pharmaceutical Products Liability 
With prescription drug liability, class action becomes a distinct theoretical 
possibility.  First, pharmaceutical companies are lucrative targets26 for both the 
plaintiffs’ bar and patients who may already bear grudges against “big 
corporations” (and perhaps the drug industry in particular).  Second, as Part V 
outlines in greater detail, the search for pharmaceutical plaintiffs is far easier 
than the search for malpractice victims.  Television and other advertisements by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys need only identify a drug by name, and most patients who 
have taken the medication will recognize whether they are potential plaintiffs.27  
 
 24. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 64–71. 
 25. Myron S. Greenberg & Megan A. Blazina, What Mediators Need To Know About Class 
Actions: A Basic Primer, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 191, 203 (2004). 
 26. The allure of the industry’s deep pockets is what ensures that even individual plaintiffs’ cases 
will proceed without class actions.  See Part V, infra.  Indeed, twenty-seven percent of patients in a 
Harris Poll conducted at the behest of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce indicated that they would likely 
join a suit even if they had not experienced side effects from a drug.  INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PHARMACEUTICAL LIABILITY STUDY: REPORT ON FINDINGS 45 
(2003), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.org/resources/PharmaceuticalLiabilityStudy_ 
report.pdf [hereinafter PHARMACEUTICAL LIABILITY STUDY]. 
 27. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-95-169, MEDICAL LIABILITY: IMPACT ON 
HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN COSTS EXTENDS BEYOND INSURANCE 16 (1995), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/ai95169.pdf (noting that most pharmaceutical litigation has involved 
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Last but not least, Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
serves as the model for many state equivalents, stipulates that any class must be 
“so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable . . . .”28  The sheer 
number of plaintiffs involved in pharmaceutical torts will usually satisfy this 
“numerosity” prerequisite for class actions, in addition to providing financial 
incentive by aggregating claims.  In the Vioxx litigation, for example, there are 
currently 14,200 lawsuits.29 
The threshold inquiry here, of course, is whether most plaintiffs in a would-
be pharmaceutical class action do in fact hail from modest socioeconomic 
backgrounds.  That question is most pertinent with respect to distributive 
justice, especially if, as Havighurst and Richman insist, wealthier patients 
consume more health care,30 including prescription drugs.  After all, consider 
the situations in which pharmaceutical torts typically arise.  Standard failure to 
provide arguably “medically necessary” drugs would fall under the rubric of 
medical malpractice or insurance coverage claims.31  In contrast, pharmaceutical 
litigation occurs when previously unknown side effects begin to emerge with 
these medications.  This was the case with Rezulin, a supplementary treatment 
for adult-onset diabetes that is associated with liver abnormalities.32  In these 
types of circumstances, socioeconomic bias may rear its ugly head, whether it is 
in the form of caregivers providing more care to wealthier patients (even when 
the medical community itself views the care as necessary),33 or the inability of 
poorer patients to navigate the health care system.  Both would increase the 
ratio of richer to poorer plaintiffs. 
Similarly, the other prototypical scenario for liability claims occurs when 
elective medications allegedly cause injury.  The building legal battle over 
hormone therapy, and whether it increases the risk of breast cancer,34 falls in 
this category.  Hormone therapy helps prevent osteoporosis and alleviates 
postmenopausal symptoms such as hot flashes and vaginal discomfort by 
replacing the hormones that a woman loses when she enters menopause.  
Although postmenopausal symptoms can severely affect functional capacity (by 
disrupting sleep and concentration, for example), physicians opting not to 
prescribe hormone therapy will not thereby jeopardize a woman’s health so 
 
brand-name medications).  See Part V, infra, for a discussion of how brand-name recognition facilitates 
the search for potential plaintiffs. 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
 29. Heather Won Tesoriero, Merck Is Victorious in New Orleans Vioxx Trial, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
27, 2006, at A13 [hereinafter Vioxx Trial]. 
 30. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 42. 
 31. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428 (West 2000) (outlining the liability of insurance plans for 
failure to provide “medically necessary” health care). 
 32. In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Lit., 210 F.R.D. 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 33. Steven M. Asch et al., Measuring Underuse of Necessary Care Among Elderly Medicare 
Beneficiaries Using Inpatient and Outpatient Claims, 284 JAMA 2325 (2000) (finding that low-income 
beneficiaries were less likely to receive necessary care for seventeen health indicators). 
 34. Molly Selvin, Hormone Suits Face Hurdle as Drugs Keep FDA Backing, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 
2005, at C1. 
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long as the woman uses other medications or interventions for osteoporosis 
prevention.  Therefore, with hormone therapy, physicians may use the 
intervention more frequently—as defensive medicine—with more affluent and 
medically savvy patients seeking additional care.  Indeed, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approved Prempro (one of many hormone therapy 
regimens) only for postmenopausal symptoms and osteoporosis prevention, but 
available data support possible cardiovascular protection if women start taking 
the medication right around menopause.35  Again, such “off-label” benefits may 
prompt greater consumption by wealthier, more knowledgeable patients and 
correspondingly skew the plaintiff pool. 
In short, it seems that whether the drugs are essential or elective, higher-
income patients may consume disproportionately more and thereby 
overrepresent the plaintiff population in pharmaceutical torts.  So could a class 
action truly champion the less affluent?  Without sufficient demographic 
information, the answer must come by inference.  Fortunately, however, market 
forces may still render it a foregone conclusion.  Specifically, the profit motive 
(and philanthropy, depending on whom one asks) drives the pharmaceutical 
industry toward prevalent diseases or conditions.  The more widespread the 
problem, the larger the market to which a company can sell a product and 
recoup its extraordinary financial investment in discovering and launching the 
drug.36  Take hormone therapy for example.  Every woman will enter 
menopause as long as she lives to her fifties.  Likewise, Rezulin targeted the 
obesity and diabetes epidemic in this country,37 as did Baycol (an anti-
cholesterol medication associated with muscle damage) and Fen-Phen and 
Redux (diet drugs associated with high blood pressure in the pulmonary arteries 
and heart valve injury, respectively).  The anti-depressant Paxil was another 
heavy hitter until reports of suicide and homicide ushered the drug into 
courtrooms, and the list continues with Vioxx (arthritis/pain), Celebrex (same), 
Norplant (contraception), and Propulsid (heartburn and gastro-esophageal 
reflux).38  These medications spawned the bulk of pharmaceutical tort litigation 
in recent years.39  The mind-numbing number of eligible and actual patients for 
 
 35. See, e.g., Francine Grodstein, JoAnn E. Manson & Meir J. Stampfer, Hormone Therapy and 
Coronary Heart Disease: The Role of Time Since Menopause and Age at Hormone Initiation, 15 J. 
WOMEN’S HEALTH 35, 35 (2006) (“Women beginning [hormone therapy] near menopause had a 
significantly reduced risk of [coronary heart disease].”). 
 36. Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New 
Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 151 (2003) (estimating the cost of 
developing and marketing one drug at $802 million). 
 37. See Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Obesity Epidemic Increases 
Dramatically in the United States: CDC Director Calls for National Prevention Effort (Oct. 26, 1999), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/r991026.htm. 
 38. See, e.g., Stephanie Saul, Senators Ask Drug Giant To Explain Grants to Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 6, 2005, at C3 (reporting that Johnson & Johnson paid $90 million to settle Propulsid lawsuits); 
Gardiner Harris, Spizter Sues a Drug Maker, Saying It Hid Negative Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at 
A1 (discussing litigation over Paxil). 
 39. Russell G. Thornton, Defending Claims Related to Prescribing Drugs or Using Medical Devices, 
15 BAYLOR UNIV. MED. CENTER PROC. 102, 102 (2002). 
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these products practically dictates that a representative majority of plaintiffs are 
from modest backgrounds, notwithstanding any socioeconomic biases in health 
care delivery. 
In fact, short of lowering prices, the industry combats barriers to access on 
both the consumer and the provider ends.  On the patient end, direct-to-
consumer (DTC) advertising informs individuals of their candidacy for a 
medication and encourages them to talk to their doctors.40  As for physicians, 
pharmaceutical companies sponsor continuing medical education and visit their 
offices to discuss how a product may improve the health of their patients.  
While the precise effect of these promotional and educational campaigns 
remains difficult to quantify, that companies spend millions of dollars on such 
efforts attests to their efficacy—both in terms of generating profit and ensuring 
that patients receive important medical interventions.  In 2004, for instance, the 
industry spent more than $4 billion on DTC advertising.41  Whether such 
expenditures are justified from a liability standpoint is for juries to decide—is it 
all about profit, or do the dollar amounts also reflect how strongly a company 
believes its product will better patients’ lives?  The relevant point here is that 
market maximization and advertising by the pharmaceutical industry, behaviors 
that are often criticized, may not only attenuate socioeconomic disparities by 
increasing consumption by the less affluent, but also assure that a class action 
would recruit far greater numbers of modest-income plaintiffs. 
IV 
PHARMACEUTICAL CLASS ACTIONS IN PRACTICE 
A. Overall Result 
Despite the virtual guarantee of legions of average- to lower-income 
plaintiffs, however, class actions have not lived up to their promise in 
pharmaceutical torts.  Plaintiffs must satisfy four requirements for a suit to 
proceed as a class action: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are 
questions of law and fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.42 
But, as one court recently observed, “[t]o date, no [federal] Court of Appeals 
decision has approved class certification of an action involving prescription 
drugs.”43  In fact, in the past twenty-five years, all eleven federal circuits have 
 
 40. Joel S. Weissman et al., Physicians Report on Patient Encounters Involving Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertising, 2004 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W4-219. 
 41. Betsy Querna, The Big Pill Pitch: Drug Companies Are Marketing Directly to Patients.  Is This 
Empowering or Perilous?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 6, 2005, at 52. 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 43. In re Baycol Prods. Liab. Lit., 218 F.R.D. 197, 204 (D. Minn. 2003). 
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denied class certification in over forty prescription drug and medical device 
cases.44 
Such uniformity of precedent underscores the intent of the judicial system—
to secure justice for individual parties, or to remedy shared grievances, not 
necessarily to promote distributive justice across broad socioeconomic groups.  
The following section illustrates why courts appropriately deny class 
certification on Rule 23(a) grounds to safeguard party interests, 
notwithstanding any regressive implications.  As mentioned, the purpose here is 
to help determine whether reforms in the pharmaceutical tort adjudication 
process are a logical platform for distributive justice.  The Rule 23(a) analysis 
indicates that the class action framework, arguably the most pertinent locus of 
inquiry because of its ability to rally the masses, does not avail itself as a 
promising candidate for change.  The highly personalized nature of 
pharmaceutical litigation, as magnified through class certification review, 
encapsulates and highlights the problem with converting the justice system into 
a distributive justice system for health care. 
B. Rule 23(a) Factors 
1. Commonality of Facts 
In most pharmaceutical torts, facts are highly individualized.  Hundreds to 
thousands of putative class members took different doses of a product for 
different periods of time, whereas available scientific data may only suggest risk 
of a complication after certain durations of use or dose exposures.  With the 
hormone therapy litigation, for instance, the seminal study that launched the 
litigation was the Women’s Health Initiative (WHI) trial.45  The study reported 
an increased risk of breast cancer in women taking combination estrogen and 
progestin hormone therapy, but only after an average of five years on therapy, 
and only among women who had used hormone therapy prior to enrolling in 
the study.46  Furthermore, given that the hormone therapy formulation in the 
 
 44. Wyeth’s Opposition to Motion for Class Certification at 1 n.2, In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Lit., 
No. 4:03CV1507 WRW (E.D. Ark. May 13, 2005) (citing federal and state cases) (on file with author). 
 45. Writing Group for the Women’s Health Initiative Investigators, Risks and Benefits of Estrogen 
Plus Progestin in Healthy Postmenopausal Women: Principle Results from the Women’s Health Initiative 
Randomized Controlled Trial, 288 JAMA 321 (2002).  This was the first of several reports on the 
findings from the Women’s Health Initiative trial.  See also Dan Lynch, Wyeth Fights Class Action 
Status for Prempro Suit in Miami, DAILY BUS. REV., March 24, 2005, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1111572312001 (tracing the origins of the hormone therapy 
litigation to the Women’s Health Initiative study). 
 46. Rowan T. Chlebowski et al., Influence of Estrogen Plus Progestin on Breast Cancer and 
Mammography in Healthy Postmenopausal Women: The Women’s Health Initiative Randomized Trial, 
289 JAMA 3243, 3248 (2003) (indicating in Table 2 that breast cancer risk increased to a statistically 
significant degree, i.e., in a manner consistent with a true rather than a chance finding, only in women 
who 1) had been taking estrogen plus progestin during the trial for five years and 2) had taken hormone 
therapy prior to enrolling in the study).  In Table 2, the ninety-five percent confidence intervals (95% 
CI) for the listed hazard ratios (HR) include 1.0 until year five.  For example, the 0.60 HR in the 
bottom left corner of the table is associated with a 95% CI of 0.29-1.23, so the 95% CI includes 1.0 (the 
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WHI study contained 0.625 mg of conjugated equine estrogen (CEE) and 2.5 
mg of progestin, but lower doses of hormone therapy are also available, how the 
findings of the WHI trial translate to plaintiffs who used lower dosages is less 
clear.47  Even among class representatives, there were women who took other 
combination hormone therapies that varied in terms of dose as well as 
composition.48  Finally, each plaintiff has a unique medical history and hence 
individual levels of risk.  For example, women who have a history of breast 
cancer in their family, give birth to their first child after the age of thirty, or start 
menstruating before the age of twelve are at greater risk of developing breast 
cancer regardless of hormone therapy use.49 
All the foregoing variables address only causation, but the story becomes 
even more complex when a court considers other elements of plaintiffs’ 
complaints, such as deceptive advertising, failure to warn, and detrimental 
reliance.  Again, with the hormone therapy litigation, even if plaintiffs 
concentrated their attack on one manufacturer, in lieu of other makers of 
hormone therapy, each plaintiff would have seen only selected bits from a vast 
array of television, periodical, and other advertisements over the past decade 
that the product has been on the market—or none at all.  Likewise, as science 
has evolved, so have the FDA-approved warnings that accompany the 
medication.50 
Lastly, with prescription drugs, the learned intermediary rule comes to bear.  
Unlike other products about which consumers can make decisions entirely on 
their own, access to prescription drugs must be through a learned 
intermediary—a physician.  Under the learned intermediary doctrine, a 
manufacturer’s duty to warn about a drug’s risks runs to physicians, not to 
patients.51  A plaintiff therefore must show that in his or her own particular case 
“the inadequacy of the manufacturer’s warning affected [the physician’s] use of 
the product.”52  In other words, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that but for the 
company’s alleged failure to warn, his or her physician would not have 
 
low end of the confidence interval is 0.29 while the high end surpasses 1.0 to reach 1.23).  Id.  HRs are 
not increased to a statistically significant degree unless the low ends of their 95% CI exceed 1.0. 
 47. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NAT’L INST. ON AGING, 
UNDERSTANDING THE WOMEN’S HEALTH INITIATIVE STUDY OF USING ESTROGEN ALONE 1 (2004) 
(“Does using a different estrogen and/or progestin or another dose change the risk?”). 
 48. For example, some women took CEE versus other estrogens; the variance was similar with 
different progestins/progesterone.  Wyeth’s Opposition to Motion for Class Certification, supra note 44, 
at 13–14.  Their durations of therapy also ranged from six months to more than eight years.  Id. at 13. 
 49. American Cancer Society, Detailed Guide: Breast Cancer, 
http://www.cancer.org/docroot/CRI/content/CRI_2_4_2X_What_are_the_risk_factors_for_breast_canc
er_5.asp (last visited June 18, 2006). 
 50. Since 1995 the Prempro labeling alone has changed nine times. 
 51. See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Lit. 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 803 (E.D. Tex. 2002) 
(“The learned intermediary doctrine provides an exception to the general rule imposing a duty on 
manufacturers to warn consumers about the risks of their products.”); see also E.R. Squibb & Sons Inc. 
v. Farnes, 697 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. 1997) (“Florida law requires that the manufacturer provide an 
adequate warning only to the physician, or ‘learned intermediary.’”). 
 52. Alexander v. Danek Med. Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1350 (M.D. Fla. 1999). 
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prescribed the medication in question.  This burden of proof is already very 
individualistic based on personal medical history alone; physicians have to 
weigh a given patient’s needs and risks to ascertain whether a drug would be 
appropriate.  The learned intermediary rule complicates the picture by 
expanding the inquiry to include what any single prescriber knew about a drug, 
and upon which source(s) of information he or she relied.  Physicians obtain 
drug information from myriad sources besides manufacturer labeling, including 
journal articles, textbooks, continuing medical education, and peer discussions, 
and each will put more or less stock in certain references. 
In short, individual facts will generally overwhelm any commonalities 
between cases.  This is true even when plaintiffs seek to certify a medical- 
monitoring subclass, as they frequently do in pharmaceutical torts.  Plaintiffs in 
a would-be medical-monitoring subclass are patients who have consumed a 
product, but who have not developed the disease or complication purportedly 
connected with the product.53  The essence of their grievance is that a drug 
elevated their risk of a bad outcome.  They demand extra medical surveillance 
so that any allegedly product-related problems can be detected and managed 
swiftly.  For instance, plaintiffs in the hormone therapy litigation unsuccessfully 
sought breast cancer screening beyond routine mammography.54  Medical-
monitoring claims may circumvent some of the case-by-case scrutiny necessary 
to assess causality in patients with manifest injuries, but plaintiffs must 
nevertheless establish that some sort of surveillance program beyond the 
standard of care can more readily detect a disease or condition.  As the court in 
Perez v. Metabolife International, Inc. found, “This element demands 
individualized rulings, because many of the individuals would normally be 
recommended to undergo exactly the same diagnostic screenings and tests 
based on risk factors other than [a product’s] use.”55 
Returning to the hormone therapy example, even if such medications added 
to a woman’s risk of breast cancer, her other combined risk factors—age at first 
menstruation, body weight, history of childbirth, genetic predisposition to 
breast cancer, and even alcohol intake—have largely predetermined the level of 
screening she should receive.  Thus a physician must carefully evaluate whether 
an individual patient should undergo additional monitoring based on his or her 
own medical history.  For most women, routine mammographies suffice.56  To 
require more than annual mammography, a court, with assistance from medical 
 
 53. Wyeth Inc. v. Gottlieb, 930 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (citing the trial court’s 
definition of a medical-monitoring subclass to include asymptomatic women taking hormone therapy 
during a particular time period). 
 54. Gottlieb v. Wyeth Inc., No. 02-18165 CA 32 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2005), rev’d, Wyeth Inc. v. Gottlieb, 
930 So. 2d 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
 55. 218 F.R.D. 262, 272 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 56. Robert A. Smith et al., American Cancer Society Guidelines for Breast Cancer Screening: 
Update 2003, 53 CA: CANCER J. CLINICIANS 141, 143 (2003), available at 
http://caonline.amcancersoc.org/cgi/content/abstract/53/3/141 (recommending earlier and more 
frequent mammographies for women at increased risk of breast cancer and noting that additional 
screening modalities are not justified by current evidence). 
10__WU.DOC 3/7/2007  3:59 PM 
218 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 69:207 
experts, would have to examine a woman’s particular medical situation no less 
closely, particularly because extra testing can incur physical as well as pecuniary 
costs.57 
2. Commonality of Law 
Courts have also denied class certification in mass pharmaceutical litigation 
because common issues of law do not predominate.58  Choice-of-law rules mean 
that federal courts almost always apply the law of the state where a plaintiff 
resides and consumed a product.59  Prescription drug liability cases involve 
patients from across the country.  Hence, for nationwide or at least multistate 
pharmaceutical class actions, federal courts must discern and apply the laws of 
multiple jurisdictions.  Not surprisingly, the laws of different states vary 
substantially.  For example, some states do not recognize medical monitoring as 
a cause of action for uninjured plaintiffs (patients who have yet to develop the 
disease or condition associated with a product),60 while others, such as 
Maryland, have yet to resolve the matter.61 
If class certification were granted, such a disparate legal landscape would 
place a federal court in the difficult and inappropriate position of making state 
law and violating state sovereignty.  As the Rezulin court observed, 
Many states never have recognized a claim for medical monitoring, a circumstance 
that would force this Court into the undesirable position of attempting to predict how 
their courts of last resort would resolve that issue.  Those states that have done so 
have adopted widely varying criteria for recovery.  There simply is no justification for 
embarking on so complex a path.62 
 
 57. For example, the screening itself may be invasive and therefore carry risks, such as the risk of 
infection with breast needle biopsies.  In addition, a false positive—an assay registering positive for a 
disease or condition when the patient does not actually suffer from the disease or condition—can 
prompt further workup that subjects a patient to unwarranted and potentially hazardous procedures.  
With breast cancer, a false-positive biopsy can lead to excision of a lump, i.e., extraneous surgery. 
 58. See, e.g., In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Lit., 210 F.R.D. 61, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The Court finds 
that individual questions of fact and law predominate with respect to the alleged class, that the interest 
of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution of claims is paramount and that very 
serious difficulties would be encountered in managing the putative class action were it certified.  The 
Court therefore declines to certify the proposed class.”); In re Baycol Prods. Liab. Lit., 218 F.R.D. 197, 
208 (D. Minn. 2003) (“Differences in state law, no matter how slight, are important and must be 
determined prior to certification because such differences may swamp any common issues and defeat 
predominance.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Lit., 208 
F.R.D. 133, 146 (E.D. La. 2002) (“The application of multiple state laws to a class makes manageability 
more difficult in both (b)(3) and (b)(2) class actions.”). 
 59. See In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Lit., 210 F.R.D. at 70 (“Critical liability questions therefore will 
presumptively be governed by the law of the states in which particular members of this million person 
putative class reside.”); see also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding 
that a district court presiding over a diversity-of-jurisdiction case must apply the choice-of-law 
principles of the forum state to determine what substantive law to apply). 
 60. See, e.g., Hinton ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 831–32 (Ala. 2001); Henry v. 
Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 686 (Mich. 2005); Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 440 (Nev. 
2001). 
 61. Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 251 (Md. 2000) (declining to decide whether 
medical monitoring should be recognized as a distinct cause of action under Maryland common law). 
 62. 210 F.R.D. at 74. 
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Similarly, with respect to actual injury claims, another court noted, “Some states 
do not recognize strict liability.  Some have adopted Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 402A.  Among states that have adopted the Restatement, there are 
variations.”63 
3. Typicality 
In general, the claims of putative class representatives are not typical of 
other class members.  This finding seems inevitable in light of the attendant 
individual facts.  Manufacturers have unique defenses on causation, learned 
intermediary, and other inquiries.  Thus, resolving one representative’s dispute 
would not address the controversies inherent in another plaintiff’s case. 
4. Adequacy 
Moreover, the representative parties would not fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.  For one, each plaintiff will have incurred 
different injuries.  Any disease or condition can be mild or severe, and it can 
affect patients medically, functionally, and socially to varying degrees.  For 
instance, a heart attack, the prolonged deprivation of blood-borne oxygen to 
cardiac tissues, can result in mild cardiac impairment, can significantly limit 
physical activity and hence perhaps work capacity, or can kill a patient 
outright—either by itself, or in combination with other ailments or variables. 
Furthermore, an adverse clinical outcome can occur through multiple 
mechanisms, some of which might bear a stronger connection to the medication 
in question.  Revisiting the heart attack example, atherosclerotic buildup and 
narrowing of the arteries feeding the heart could lead to a cardiac event.  
Alternatively, cardiac arrhythmia (irregular electrical conductance in the heart) 
can trigger a sudden heart attack by affecting the organ’s ability to pump blood 
to its own tissues.  Yet another mode of injury entails the rupture of an 
atherosclerotic plaque that can set off a rapid clotting reaction that occludes the 
blood supply to the heart.  The latter two processes happen acutely, whereas 
narrowing the blood vessels supplying the heart takes place gradually.  With 
Vioxx, these distinctions are crucial, since the data that instigated that litigation 
pertain to atherosclerotic rupture, not to atherosclerosis itself or to 
arrhythmia.64  In addition, each injury pathway is influenced by a patient’s 
specific medical history.  Consequently, it is unlikely that a given class 
representative will fairly and adequately safeguard just one other plaintiff’s 
interests, let alone those of hundreds or thousands of patients. 
Similarly, with medical monitoring, it is problematic for plaintiffs to insist 
that they sustained the same injury.  Indeed, plaintiffs’ attempts to certify a 
medical-monitoring subclass stem in part from the need to minimize the case-
 
 63. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 743 n.15 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 
 64. See Andrew Lawler, Vioxx Verdict: Too Little or Too Much Science?, 309 SCIENCE 1481, 1481 
(2005) (pointing out that while some researchers believe Vioxx may accelerate clotting, “Vioxx or other 
COX-2 drugs have not been associated in any study with arrhythmia”). 
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by-case discrepancies that undermine class certification of claims for manifest 
diseases or conditions.  To maintain this compartmentalization, however, 
plaintiffs must forfeit any future grievances they may have concerning a drug.  
In other words, should some of them eventually develop the affliction allegedly 
connected with a drug, they would be unable to seek compensation for the 
manifest injury itself.  Otherwise, class members would not be cohesive.  Some 
would essentially be suing over an elevated risk of an adverse event, while 
others would be suing for increased risk as well as for future complications.65  
Yet, because many states do not allow claim-splitting,66 a medical-monitoring 
class cannot simply abandon any future restitution for concrete injury and still 
“fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”67  As a matter of law, 
putative class representatives who surrender the claims of certain class members 
are inadequate for the purposes of Rule 23(a)(4).68 
C. Concluding Remarks on Pharmaceutical Tort Adjudication 
On a final note, statewide class actions have failed at the certification stage 
on the same grounds—lack of commonality, typicality, and adequacy.69  A court 
in Florida recently certified a medical-monitoring class, but the decision did not 
stand on appeal.70  Again, overriding principles of equity and fairness on the 
individual level demand this result, despite issues of distributive justice.  After 
all, although distributive justice affects individual justice,71 sacrificing individual 
justice for corporate justice merely replaces one insult with another. 
Importantly, this is not to say that drug liability law offers little or no room 
for improvements that might affect distributive justice.  For instance, the 
learned intermediary doctrine hinders the ability of pharmaceutical companies 
to make the sort of economizing decisions that Havighurst and Richman 
 
 65. And, of course, there would be no way to tell in advance which class members will or will not 
have problems down the road. 
 66. Claim-splitting occurs when a plaintiff petitions for one remedy in one suit (for example, 
medical monitoring) and later sues for other compensation (such as damages) over a related injury.  See 
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Lit., 209 F.R.D. 323, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(noting that California, Florida, Illinois, and New York all prohibit claim-splitting). 
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 68. Thompson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 189 F.R.D. 544, 550–51 (D. Minn. 1999) (refusing to certify a 
medical-monitoring class because class representatives failed to assert claims for personal injury on 
behalf of absent class members). The court found that “the named Plaintiffs’ efforts to reserve personal 
injury and damage claims may, in fact, jeopardize the class members’ rights to bring such claims in a 
subsequent case. . . . Under Minnesota law res judicata principles apply ‘not only to every matter which 
was actually litigated, but also as to every matter which might have been litigated, therein.’ . . . This 
possible prejudice to class members is simply too great for the Court to conclude that the named 
Plaintiffs’ interests are aligned with those of the class.”  Id. at 547–48 (citations omitted). 
 69. See, e.g., Albertson v. Wyeth Inc., 2005 WL 1048779 (Pa. Com. Pl. April 26, 2005) (denying 
class certification). 
 70. Wyeth Inc. v. Gottlieb, 930 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
 71. Indeed, how can a person experience justice if he or she disproportionately shoulders society’s 
burdens? 
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advocate.72  To be precise, although the learned intermediary rule rightly 
recognizes that physicians function as gatekeepers for prescription medications, 
it limits a drug company’s participation in “risk management.”  According to 
the FDA, risk management entails “a coordinated effort on the part of many 
partners in the public and private sectors,” that is, government and the 
pharmaceutical industry, to “minimi[ze] the risks associated with use of medical 
products.”73  Experts believe success is predicated upon interventions extending 
beyond “the package insert and routine post-marketing surveillance” and 
requires “pharma companies to think through not only how a drug is supposed 
to be used—the indications, contraindications, precautions, and warnings—but 
also how it will be used or misused by prescribers, dispensers, and patients 
throughout its lifecycle.”74 
In other words, it may not suffice for drug manufacturers to provide 
adequate data and warnings but ultimately defer to physician judgment in 
specific situations.  Rather, the industry should “seek to influence the behavior 
of all the parties responsible for drug safety, particularly patients, physicians, 
pharmacists, and allied medical staff.”75  The dilemma is that if manufacturers 
attempt to influence prescriber behavior—not merely by disclosing the risks 
associated with a drug, but by affirmatively instructing physicians on when to 
use or not to use a drug—they may forfeit the protection of the learned 
intermediary doctrine.  From a legal perspective, instead of exercising 
independent medical judgment, physicians would be relegated to mere vendors 
who follow industry instructions.  If so, there would be no cognizable “learned 
intermediary.”  This hazard prevents the industry from urging physicians not to 
prescribe their products to patients with higher risk-benefit ratios, 
notwithstanding “doctor’s intuition” or other idiosyncratic deviations that may 
or may not be valid for a specific patient.  Such industry-driven, conservative 
prescribing practices could save on 1) potentially unwarranted consumption, 2) 
litigation expenses, and 3) liability costs that companies may pass on to 
consumers.76 
Nevertheless, the question is not whether drug liability standards are 
perfect, but whether these imperfections should command much attention in 
 
 72. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 75 n.200 (discussing, generally, the inability of 
providers to offer or encourage less health care). 
 73. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Risk Management, http://www.fda.gov/oc/mcclellan/riskmngt.html. 
 74. See, e.g., LOU MORRIS, THE RISK MANAGEMENT MANDATE, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE 
98, 100 (May 2004).  Dr. Morris spent twenty-three years at the FDA and served as a member of the 
agency’s Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee. 
 75. Id. at 100 (emphasis added). 
 76. Although it seems self-evident that greater caution in drug use would reduce unnecessary 
consumption and help prevent lawsuits, data are scarce on whether pharmaceutical companies pass 
litigation costs on to consumers.  Nevertheless, the dearth of evidence has not halted speculation to that 
effect.  See, e.g., Scott Gottlieb, More Drug Use Will Mean More Lawsuits, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. 
ONLINE: ON THE ISSUES March 4, 2003, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.16306/pub_detail.asp 
(“Drugs can have unforeseen problems when administered to large and old populations, and the 
resulting lawsuits have been allowed to handcuff the pharmaceutical industry by limiting drug 
development and driving up drug prices.”). 
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discussions about distributive justice.  For example, with risk management, 
some might challenge whether a for-profit industry should be persuading 
physicians to practice medicine a certain way.  Moreover, many physicians may 
not listen to manufacturers in the first place, either because they rely more on 
other sources of information, or because they simply distrust pharmaceutical 
companies.  Amending the learned intermediary rule might thus accomplish 
very little.  It may be better to concentrate on other means of physician 
education.  The rationale for examining liability law is to see if the tort system 
should be a focus in efforts to eliminate socioeconomic disparities in health 
care.  In light of the aforementioned medical—and legal—complexities inherent 
in pharmaceutical torts, it seems that overhauling class certification procedures 
and other laws pertinent to drug liability may unduly jeopardize individual 
justice without closing the gap between rich and poor.  Indeed, as the next 
section explains, denial of class certification does not leave less-affluent 
pharmaceutical plaintiffs as desperate as their counterparts in medical 
malpractice. 
V 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MALPRACTICE AND PHARMACEUTICAL TORTS 
A. Profit and Logistics 
Class actions are not the primary drivers of mass pharmaceutical litigation.77  
Significant differences between medical malpractice suits and pharmaceutical 
torts help secure justice for the less wealthy in the drug liability context.  First 
and foremost, pharmaceutical companies present attractive targets for plaintiffs 
and plaintiffs’ attorneys alike.  Not surprisingly then, lawsuits will fill court 
dockets regardless of class certification.  Litigation has not ceased against Bayer 
over Baycol, for instance, and the cases against Merck continue to mount.78  The 
sheer number of plaintiffs suggests that denial of class certification may dampen 
pharmaceutical mass torts only to a limited degree. 
Also, in drug litigation, there is a tendency for plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
proceed with more meritorious clients irrespective of the clients’ wealth.  With 
medical malpractice, because complaints normally involve an isolated 
occurrence or chain of events, even similar cases remain relatively separate 
from one another.  Although the same sort of conduct might underlie several 
incidents, the cast of characters usually changes on both the plaintiff and the 
defendant sides.79  Judicial resolution of one case may have some precedential 
value, but it would not influence successive disputes to the degree that a ruling 
 
 77. This is evident from the burgeoning products liability docket despite the near universal denial 
of class certification.  See text, infra. 
 78. Vioxx Trial, supra note 29 (reporting that Merck faces 14,200 lawsuits). 
 79. See, e.g., Daniel J. Penofsky, Gynecological Malpractice Litigation, 64 Am. Jur. Trials 1 (2006) 
(summarizing malpractice cases that repeat themselves in the gynecological setting with different 
plaintiffs and defendants). 
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in a drug liability case would influence future contests over the same product.  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys in pharmaceutical litigation will hence survey their pool of 
plaintiffs and put their best foot forward.  As part of the selection process, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys may even choose modest-income patients to win a jury’s 
sympathy.  For example, the first three Vioxx cases featured a Wal-Mart 
produce manager,80 a postal worker,81 and a manager of a seafood wholesaler, 
respectively.82 
B. Advertising 
Of course, what allows the marshaling of non-wealthy plaintiffs at the outset 
is advertising by both plaintiffs’ attorneys and drug manufacturers.  DTC 
marketing by pharmaceutical companies helps generate initial demand for a 
medication.  A 2004 study by the FDA found “high levels of general awareness 
of DTC advertising.”83  Specifically, eighty-one percent of patients surveyed in 
2002 recalled seeing or hearing a prescription drug advertisement.84  Forty-three 
percent of the respondents sought more information on a drug after learning 
about it from DTC marketing, and eighteen percent reported that an 
advertisement prompted them to speak to a physician.85  These figures do not 
indicate whether less-affluent patients initiated the bulk of the office inquiries, 
but drug manufacturers cannot afford to rely on consumption by wealthier 
patients alone.  Through a combination of DTC marketing and providing 
information to prescribers, pharmaceutical companies sustain a sufficiently 
broad customer base. 
In turn, such mass communication facilitates advertising by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys.  With the names of blockbuster medications firmly implanted in the 
American consciousness, plaintiffs’ attorneys need only reference a drug for 
patients to recognize whether they might have a claim.  To elaborate, the 
capacity to highlight a distinct opportunity for legal redress does not often exist 
for medical malpractice.  General solicitations by plaintiffs’ attorneys for 
“medical malpractice” or “negligent treatment” do not help patients ascertain 
whether they have suffered an injury.  For example, a male patient may not 
realize that current screening guidelines recommend routine prostate exams 
 
 80. Kevin McCoy, Merck to Face First Vioxx Trial Before Texas Jury Next Month, USA TODAY, 
June 29, 2005, at 1B. 
 81. Marc Kaufman, Merck Wins Vioxx Lawsuit: Firm Not Held Responsible for Heart Attack, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2005, at D01. 
 82. Kevin McCoy, Merck Faces First Hearing on Vioxx Today as Lawsuits Mount, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 17, 2004, at 4B. 
 83. KATHRYN J. AIKIN ET AL., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN 
ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS ASSOCIATED WITH DTC PROMOTION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS—
SUMMARY OF FDA SURVEY RESEARCH RESULTS 85 (2004). 
 84. Id.  In 2002, 944 patients were surveyed, fifty-three percent of whom responded.  Id. at 1. 
 85. Id. at 26. 
10__WU.DOC 3/7/2007  3:59 PM 
224 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 69:207 
starting at the age of fifty to help detect prostate cancer.86  As Havighurst and 
Richman observe, this lack of knowledge disproportionately affects less-wealthy 
patients.87  In contrast, it is much easier for any patient to know whether he or 
she has ever taken Vioxx and experienced a heart attack.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys 
only have to identify 1) the drug involved and 2) the alleged side effect. 
Indeed, available data strongly suggest that the plaintiff bar’s rallying cries 
do not fall on deaf ears, especially in tandem with the extensive media coverage 
that ordinarily surrounds products liability litigation.  A 2003 Harris Interactive 
Poll conducted at the behest of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for 
Legal Reform revealed that eighty-six percent of 301 patients interviewed were 
aware of lawsuit advertisements concerning a particular drug.88  Approximately 
one in five patients (twenty-one percent) had seen an advertisement for a 
medication they were taking.89  If they were to see a lawsuit advertisement, 
nineteen percent would contact the sponsoring law firm.90  Twenty-seven 




A. Patient and Physician Response 
To be sure, pharmaceutical torts might exert regressive effects as well, albeit 
perhaps secondary to the actual litigation process and proceedings themselves.  
For instance, unwarranted fear sparked by news of litigation could prompt less-
informed, maybe less-affluent patients to stop taking a medication even though 
the benefits exceed the risks.92  With drugs that need steady compliance for the 
best results, health considerations compound the injustice of decreased health 
care consumption by modest-income patients. 
 
 86. American Cancer Society, Overview: Prostate Cancer, How is Prostate Cancer Found, 
http://www.cancer.org/docroot/CRI/content/CRI_2_2_3X_How_is_prostate_cancer_found_36.asp?sitea
rea= (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
 87. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 51 (noting that lack of information is precisely 
what allows providers to charge for more health care than less affluent patients would choose for 
themselves).  The same informational disadvantage would cause less wealthy Americans not to notice 
substandard care. 
 88. PHARMACEUTICAL LIABILITY STUDY, supra note 26, at 39. 
 89. Id. at 40. 
 90. Id. at 42. 
 91. Id. at 45. 
 92. Returning to the 2003 Harris Poll, twenty-five percent of patients would immediately stop 
taking a drug upon discovering that there is a lawsuit over the product.  Id. at 42.  Thirty-eight percent 
of the 201 physicians interviewed recalled patients who stopped taking medication despite the 
physicians’ belief that the medication was appropriate.  Id. at 26.  Twenty-nine percent of prescribers 
also reported patients who declined treatment because of ongoing litigation.  Id. at 27. 
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On the caregiver side, the threat of litigation could lead to “reverse 
defensive medicine”—where less care is delivered.93  Offhand, it is unclear 
whether the rich or the poor would bear the brunt of such apprehension.  
Conventional wisdom might predict that physicians would not withhold 
treatment from more-affluent patients because they might be sued for refusing 
to administer care.  Yet, the converse logic argues precisely the opposite.  
Physicians wary of legal problems might avoid giving a potentially litigation-
prone drug to wealthier patients, in light of their greater purported predilection 
and capability to sue. 
This lose-lose scenario raises further questions as to whether medical 
malpractice—in and of itself, or as a consequence of products liability—would 
increase or decrease the overall amount of care rendered.  The bi-directionality 
of incentives might help to explain why the CBO could not confirm that various 
state restrictions on malpractice liability attenuated so-called “defensive 
medicine.”94  If desire for profit and patient welfare are the main contributors to 
“extra” care, as the CBO proposes, then malpractice and pharmaceutical 
liability may not substantially increase net health care services, especially if 
physicians would offer more care in some situations but less in others. 
Moreover, if malpractice concerns induce physicians to provide less care to 
higher-income patients, the adage that tort liability imposes regressive 
externalities on the health care system could prove false in two respects.  First 
(and most obviously), because of litigation, higher-income patients, not the rest 
of America, might be the ones who receive less care.  Second, the cloud of 
litigation could reduce health care services, not heap more care onto those who 
already consume too much.  This can happen not just with prescription drugs, 
but with many other forms of medical interventions, including surgery.95  Threat 
of litigation could actually decrease unnecessary care, saving on direct 
expenditures as well as morbidity costs. 
Significantly, missed diagnoses are the leading cause of malpractice suits, 
comprising twenty-eight percent of total claims.96  Nevertheless, even assuming 
that all such cases stem from omission of care or poor screening,97 this twenty-
eight percent or so of all malpractice suits 1) barely surpasses the twenty-seven 
percent due to surgical incompetence, impropriety, or post-operative 
complications, and 2) still falls well short of the combined number of lawsuits 
 
 93. The 2003 Harris Poll found that forty-three percent of physicians did not prescribe what they 
regarded as a clinically indicated drug due to worries that the medication might become embroiled in 
litigation.  Id. at 23. 
 94. LIMITING TORT LIABILITY, supra note 13, at 5.  Recall that the CBO attributes “defensive 
medicine” to profit motives and patient welfare.  Id. at 6. 
 95. According to one study, “inappropriate or unnecessary surgeries” make up part of the twenty-
seven percent of malpractice claims related to surgery.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 
27, at 20–21. 
 96. Id. 
 97. This would exclude, for example, incompetence in reading X-rays and other possibilities. 
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that would not per se inspire more health care.98  In short, risk of legal trouble 
may be greater with “improper” or “unnecessary” care and adverse reactions 
than with failure to provide care at all.  The cumulative effect could be that 
“reverse defensive medicine”—withholding care that may cause litigation, 
either in the pharmaceutical, malpractice, or other contexts—outpaces extra 
care from traditional forms of defensive medicine.  The question is whether 
reluctance to administer appropriate care might incur greater costs in the long 
run and whether the rich or the poor will suffer disproportionately as a result. 
B. Industry Reaction 
Manufacturer response to products liability could also have regressive 
repercussions, but the true overall effect is similarly unclear, even when 
litigation leads to concrete, identifiable changes in the industry.  For instance, in 
the first half of 2005, drug advertising expenditures fell by 0.4% to $2.25 billion 
as pharmaceutical companies cut back on DTC marketing in the face of 
“increased public and governmental scrutiny.”99  How this might play out in 
distributive-justice terms depends in part on whether Americans were over-
purchasing beforehand or consuming at medically commensurate levels—or 
maybe under-consuming.  In addition, to some unknown degree, any savings 
that might be passed on to patients could be offset by the decrease in less-
affluent plaintiffs.  Recall that DTC promotion of medication use by the less 
wealthy simultaneously increases their participation in the legal process. 
Likewise, with regard to drug prices, pharmaceutical companies could pass 
their losses and legal bills on to consumers.100  On the other hand, liability 
encourages safety measures that reduce morbidity as well as future legal 
expenses.  However, would circumstances differ appreciably without lawsuits?  
As with malpractice, there is reason to believe that reputation costs alone would 
deter manufacturers from endangering patient welfare.  Also, all prescription 
medications must satisfy FDA safety standards before entering the stream of 
commerce.  Given these circumstances, does products liability contribute 
dramatically to patient health? 
Perhaps the more important issue is the availability of medications.  The 
National Academy of Sciences at one point concluded that pharmaceutical torts 
chill innovation in areas such as contraception.101  Given that average- and 
lower-income patients represent the lion’s share of a drug market, reduced 
 
 98. That number consists of the twenty-seven percent due to surgery-associated disputes, the 
twenty-six percent from “improper treatment” allegations, and the nineteen percent alleging “adverse 
reactions” to anesthesia, injections, and other interventions.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra 
note 27, at 20–21. 
 99. TNS Media Intelligence, U.S. Advertising Market Grows 4.5 Percent in First Half of 2005, 
http://www.tns-mi.com/news/09062005.htm (last visited June 18, 2006).  It does not seem far-fetched to 
presume that some of the scrutiny takes place in the courtroom. 
 100. See AIKIN ET AL., supra note 83. 
 101. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, DEVELOPING NEW CONTRACEPTIVES: OBSTACLES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 3–4 (1990). 
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production would translate into decreased consumption by the less affluent.102  
However, others maintain that litigation does not suppress innovation and 
production, and that drug development decisions are predicated upon 
profitability and the size of the drug market.103  Once again, therefore, the 
relevance of tort reform to distributive justice seems unsettled. 
Of note, even if the drug pipeline continues unabated, litigation could still 
jeopardize patients, particularly the less educated and less wealthy.  Many 
physicians, to say nothing of patients, believe that the scientific content in 
prescription drug labels has become needlessly complicated because of 
defensive behavior by pharmaceutical companies.104  Of course, from the 
industry perspective, the hazards of allegedly incomplete labels are quite real.  
For example, in the hormone therapy litigation, plaintiffs have insinuated that 
FDA-approved warnings about breast cancer in general do not suffice as 
warnings about a rare subtype of breast cancer, even though physicians would 
not approach these tumors any differently and the cancer subtype has a better 
prognosis.105  Such accusations may indeed inspire ever more detailed and 
complex drug labels that could prompt less-affluent, less-informed patients not 
to take clinically indicated medications, or to use them improperly.  According 
to the FDA, approximately three hundred thousand preventable adverse events 
occur per year in the United States, many as a result of confusing medical 
information.106 
In response, the FDA recently promulgated new labeling rules that require 
manufacturers to highlight critical data in a concise manner while preempting 
 
 102. That is, if a product that targets a large segment of the population is never produced because of 
litigation concerns, most of the people deprived of the medication will be average Americans, not 
wealthy Americans.  As Havighurst and Richman point out, more care is not necessarily better care, 
Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 65 n.174 (noting that more care in the form of defensive 
medicine does not necessarily translate into better health outcomes), but the fact that certain 
socioeconomic groups may receive even less care than they might otherwise is still relevant to the issue 
of distributive justice. 
 103. Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability for Bad Outcomes from Drug Therapy: The Doctor, the 
Hospital, the Pharmacy, and the Drug Firm, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 377, 417 (1996) (“In the pharmaceutical 
industry, little evidence exists showing a chilling effect on innovation, and some industry insiders have 
observed little effect of any kind from the threat of litigation.  Potential profitability and the size of the 
drug market are the real sources of drug development decisions.”) (citations omitted).  In other words, 
although litigation costs might reduce profitability, the decrease may be too inconsequential to keep a 
medication off the shelves. 
 104. PHARMACEUTICAL LIABILITY STUDY, supra note 26, at 20. 
 105. See, e.g., Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Breast Cancer, 
http://www.fhcrc.org/research/diseases/breast_cancer/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) (qualifying the 
association between hormone therapy and lobular breast cancer—a rare variant of breast cancer—by 
noting that lobular cancers carry better prognoses).  To date, no medical organization or society has 
advocated an approach for screening or treating lobular breast cancer that differs from the standard of 
care for breast cancer in general. 
 106. Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Announces New Prescription Drug 
Information Format to Improve Patient Safety (Jan. 18, 2006), 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2005/NEW01272.html. 
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liability under state law for FDA-approved labels.107  The preemption clause has 
drawn criticism from Democratic leaders who view the regulation as an 
unabashed attempt by the Republican administration to shield the 
pharmaceutical industry from liability.108  Meanwhile, agency officials continue 
to insist, as they have across administration changes, that FDA review and 
approval of drug labels ensures the integrity of the information patients and 
physicians receive.109  Thus, it seems policymakers concur that simpler, user-
friendly labels will improve health care, but diverge as to whether patients 
injured by medications should recover damages if they can establish causation.110  
That the crux of the disagreement concerns compensation for plaintiffs—and 
not the benefits of extra-judicial measures such as FDA oversight—serves as yet 
another reminder that tort litigation is first and foremost about individual 
justice, not distributive justice or other matters of public policy. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
To be sure, the foregoing discussion does not come close to a 
comprehensive overview of the possible ramifications of pharmaceutical 
products liability, let alone medical torts as a whole.  Nonetheless, even this 
limited survey shows that tort law may not provide an effective or desirable 
means of rectifying socioeconomic disparities in health care. 
As a final case in point, one of the current legal standards for proving that 
physician conduct or a particular drug or intervention caused a plaintiff’s injury, 
the “substantial contributing factor” test,111 may make it more difficult for less-
affluent patients to prevail in court.  Under this standard, a patient must 
demonstrate that, despite several other actual or potential contributors to his or 
her grievance, the alleged malpractice, medication, or intervention was a 
“substantial” causal link.112  Modest-income patients may fight an uphill battle 
because, as Havighurst and Richman observe, they tend to receive less care and 
 
 107. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and 
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3933 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at C.F.T. pts. 201, 314 & 
601). 
 108. FDA News, Democrats Consider Legislation to Halt Labeling Preemption, Jan. 23, 2006, 
http://www.fdanews.com/dailies/drugdaily/2_267/news/50910-1.html. 
 109. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and 
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934. 
 110. See Lisa Richwine (Reuters), US FDA Limits Drug Liability in Label Revamp (Jan. 19, 2006), 
available at http://www.emedicine.com/news.asp?name=20060119rglt002.xml&page=all.  Expressing 
outrage over the preemption clause while acknowledging the benefits of the new labeling requirements, 
Senator Edward Kennedy said, “It’s a typical abuse by the Bush Administration—take a regulation to 
improve the information that doctors and patients receive about prescription drugs and turn it into a 
protection against liability for the drug industry.” 
 111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a) (1965). 
 112. Id. 
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be in poorer health.113  They may hence have more risk factors that predispose 
them to the disease or condition that brought them to court. 
Yet, altering the substantial contributing factor test would put the cart 
before the horse.  The root of the problem is the poorer health of less-affluent 
patients.  Unless and until that is remedied, the health disparity will persist 
irrespective of the likelihood for a legal victory.  Moreover, the win would come 
at the cost of justice for the defendants.  They may pay even though other 
variables caused the plaintiffs’ maladies.  This could itself exacerbate 
socioeconomic disparities if physicians and pharmaceutical companies pass 
these expenses on to patients. 
Fundamentally then, Havighurst and Richman were correct in saying, “It is, 
of course, not obvious how a system that permits injured patients to recover 
large amounts of money from professionals and elite institutions might 
ultimately serve the interests of the latter groups,”114 or at least 
disproportionately burdens the less well off.  However, the end result is not 
obvious for reasons that are beyond the scope of their article.  First, the 
downstream implications of tort reform are unclear.  For example, would 
curbing or even outright eliminating tort liability address “defensive medicine” 
if profit motives are the real culprit?  Does litigation, or the threat thereof, 
significantly influence drug safety, or do reputational costs and FDA 
supervision sufficiently protect consumers?  Havighurst and Richman are right 
to note that medical torts may be a non-trivial source of distributive injustice,115 
but they themselves appropriately await additional empirical evidence before 
issuing a verdict. 
Second, it is not obvious that amending the legal framework would 
appreciably level the playing field or bring about a more equitable state of 
affairs.  The notoriety and financial allure of pharmaceutical torts helps lower- 
and average- income patients secure legal representation, and capping 
economic damages would not help less-wealthy malpractice victims recognize or 
pursue their claims.  Adjusting the class certification procedure, income-based 
compensation, or other facets of adjudication may lead only to individual 
injustice—an ironic consequence when distributive justice is itself predicated on 
fairness to the individual.  After all, distributive injustices are deplorable 
precisely because individuals shoulder a greater load than fairness would 
warrant. 
Should a medical regime in which “you get what you pay for” entail that 
“you don’t get what you sue for”?  Unless further research yields compelling 
support for sacrificing individual merit for the common good, policymakers 
 
 113. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 42. 
 114. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 64. 
 115. See JOINT ECON. COMM., LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: ISSUES AND EVIDENCE, 
REP., 108th Cong., at 6 (2003), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/tort/05-06-03.pdf (estimating that 
in 2001, malpractice added $350 to the health insurance premiums paid by a family of four). 
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should look to extra-judicial solutions for socioeconomic disparities in health 
care instead of converting the justice system into a distributive justice system. 
